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R888Finally, the most likely explanation
for the difference between the studies
is that in the previous experiments
[10–12], the movement patterns of the
animals were quite isotropic — leading
to isotropic, circular place
fields — whereas in the experiments
of Hayman et al. [2], the movement
patterns were highly anisotropic, with
mostly horizontal movement
components (Figure 1A, blue lines).
Similarly, the visual inputs in previous
studies seemed quite isotropic [10–12],
while the visual inputs in the study by
Hayman et al. [2] were quite
anisotropic, with gray-colored uniform
floors that provided little visual
information in the vertical dimension, in
contrast to the walls that were covered
with many objects and provided a rich
set of cues in the horizontal dimension
[2]. This asymmetry in sensory inputs
and in behavior may have led to the
anisotropic, vertically elongated firing
fields of place cells and grid cells in the
study by Hayman et al. [2] (Figure 1A).
In other words, the hypothesis is that
isotropic movement patterns
and isotropic sensory inputs lead
to isotropic spatial representation
[10,12], while anisotropic movement
patterns and anisotropic sensory
inputs lead to anisotropic spatial
firing patterns [2].
How could one test this hypothesis?
One possibility would be to perform
recordings from place cells and grid
cells in a mammal that can move freely
and isotropically through real
three-dimensional space: Namely,
record from the brains of flying bats.
On two-dimensional planes, place cells
in bat hippocampus and grid cellsin bat entorhinal cortex exhibit
remarkably similar spatial activity
patterns to those of two-dimensional
place cells and grid cells in rats [10,16].
In flight, bats exhibit highly complex
three-dimensional flight maneuvers
[17,18]. Therefore, the prediction is
that in bats flying freely in
three-dimensional space (Figure 1B,
blue line), the three-dimensional place
fields of hippocampal neurons should
be isotropic, with roughly spherical
shape (Figure 1B). Such experiments
require the development of either
wired or wireless telemetric recording
techniques in freely flying
bats — methods which we recently
developed in our laboratory [19].
It remains to be seen whether this
prediction for isotropic firing fields
indeed holds true in the case
of three-dimensional spatial
representation in the brain of freely
flying bats.
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Emotions beyond the BubbleA new study of how neurons in the human amygdala represent faces and their
component features argues for a holistic representation.Hanlin Tang1 and Gabriel Kreiman1,2,3
Visual input from the retina travels
through a cascade of processes in
the neocortex to the highest echelons
of the brain, eventually feeding into
areas that govern memory, emotion,
cognition and action. An importantstep to explaining these higher brain
functions is to first understand
and quantitatively characterize the
neuronal circuits behind the
transformation of the pixel-like
visual input to the complex
behaviorally relevant format in higher
brain centers.As reported recently in Current
Biology, Rutishauser et al. [1]
courageously attacked this question
by recording the activity of individual
neurons in the human brain while
subjects view and act upon images
of faces. The researchers focussed
their study on the amygdala, a region
of the brain that receives direct
visual input from the inferior temporal
cortex and plays a central role in
processing emotions [2]. Higher
brain centers that govern complex
behavior are typically difficult to study,
and the amygdala is no exception.
Studies in rodents and non-human
Dispatch
R889primates can take advantage of
electrophysiological techniques to
monitor the activity of individual
neurons, but it is not always trivial to
design behavioral paradigms that tap
into the rich repertoire of human
emotions. Non-invasive studies of the
human amygdala suffer from poor
spatial and/or temporal resolution.
Rutishauser et al. [1] combined the
best of both worlds by examining
neuronal activity in epileptic patients
in whom electrodes had been
implanted for clinical reasons [3,4].
This type of recording can provide
insights about human cognition at the
level of individual neurons and local
circuits.
Previous single unit studies have
revealed that neurons in the primate
amygdala (in humans and monkeys)
respond to complex visual shapes,
including faces and other stimuli [5–8].
However, it was not clear whether
these responses require visual
presentation of the whole stimulus,
or whether certain parts or features
of the stimulus are sufficient to elicit
a selective response. Because the
amygdala is involved in recognizing
emotions, the integration of different
features into a whole percept may
provide clues about how emotions
are processed. Rutishauser et al. [1]
hypothesized that the representation
in the amygdala may have ‘holistic’
characteristics: that is, that neurons
might be particularly sensitive to whole
stimuli as opposed to stimulus parts.
The authors used an experimental
paradigm in which face images
are presented through ‘bubbles’ such
that only partial information is available
to the viewer, who has to make
a categorical discrimination based
on the input.
What do neurons in the amygdala
say about all this holistic business?
Rutishauser et al. [1] found that
several amygdala neurons prefer
whole stimuli as opposed to specific
parts or features. These neurons show
surprising sensitivity in their firing
rate responses to small degrees
of occlusion in the stimuli, suggesting
a ‘holistic’ representation. The
responses are not necessarily
monotonic and often defy our
intuitions. In fact, the firing activity
in response to stimulus parts
does not reveal any immediately
obvious relationship to the responses
to the whole stimuli: the authors
argue that the former cannot predictthe latter. Intriguingly, in many
instances, more information leads to
smaller responses.
Given these puzzling observations,
it is worth pondering the visual inputs
to the amygdala and the degree to
which the incoming information
reflects features or wholes or both.
Visual shape information is conveyed
to the amygdala primarily through
regions in inferior temporal cortex in
monkeys [9] (less is known about the
detailed neuroanatomical
connections in humans). One
possibility is that the input provides
information about features and is
combined in the amygdala in order to
interpret the emotions conveyed by
the whole stimulus. This notion is
consistent with the results of several
neurophysiological recordings in the
macaque monkey inferior temporal
cortex, where neurons seem to
respond to complex shapes and
features (for example, [10–13] among
many others). Alternatively, regions
of inferior temporal cortex that feed
into the amygdala may contain
neurons that share some properties
with the ones reported by Rutishauser
et al. [1], such as enhanced responses
to whole objects [14].
It is not easy to interpret the
neurophysiological responses without
the aid of clear theoretical and
computational models. The problem
of object completion from partial
information has received significant
attention in the computational
neuroscience literature. Object
completion is relevant to the current
study because the images were seen
through bubbles, making object
recognition from partial information
a necessary step for a putative ‘holistic’
representation. Attractor networks
show a remarkable ability to complete
patterns by driving activity according
to well-specified dynamical rules
that guide the system from arbitrary
starting points towards stored
memories [15].
Some authors have speculated that
the neuronal responses in the
hippocampus are reminiscent of the
dynamical patterns described by
attractor networks [16]. The extent
to which these similarities extend
to the amygdala are not clear. These
attractor network models rely
on massive recurrent connectivity
and contrast with other computational
architectures where features are
combined in purely feed-forwardhierarchical fashion (for example,
[17,18]). Several computational
models of the ventral visual stream
progressively build neurons that
respond to more complex features
using input from the parts
represented in the previous layer
[17–20]. It is conceivable (but far from
clear) that hierarchical feature-based
representations throughout the
ventral visual stream encounter
attractor network architectures at the
highest echelons. It will be interesting
and important for the field to reflect
upon the type of computational
principles that can give rise to the
variety and non-monotonic nature of
the responses reported by
Rutishauser et al. [1].
The computational models
also highlight the difficulties inherent
in definitions about wholes and
parts. In the current study [1], as in
many other studies, there is an
anthropomorphic distinction
between wholes and parts. Further
inspection shows that these
definitions are far from trivial. Isn’t
a face a part of a whole individual? Or
why not consider the eyes as
a separate whole? Is ‘F’ a whole letter
or is it part of the letter ‘E’? Perhaps
the distinction between features and
wholes can be accounted for at least
partly, by experience with particular
combinations of features that tend
to appear together in certain
configurations. Simple null models
may not know about ‘whole objects’,
often work in feature spaces that
are indifferent to the charm of faces
and may not necessarily be able to
distinguish emotions in the images.
Inasmuch as these null models fail
to explain the bewildering
complexity and beauty of the
neurophysiology in the amygdala,
the current study elegantly forces
us to go back and build more
elaborate theories and
algorithms.
One of the nice aspects of doing
science is that good work can lead
to more work. Thus, several
questions emerge from the work of
Rutishauser et al. [1]. As outlined
above, the definition of ‘wholes’ and
‘parts’ is not trivial. It seems
important to further understand the
visual input to areas such as the
amygdala so that we can better
describe what computational
properties are unique to the
amygdala and which ones are
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The authors focus on face images,
but the study leaves open the
possibility that the amygdala can
have similar responses to non-face
objects. Is the ‘‘holistic’’ nature of the
representation limited to faces [14]?
The dynamics of the neuronal
responses may provide further
insights regarding the computational
principles behind recognition and
object completion. What type of
computational models can give rise
to the non-intuitive responses
described in this study?
The inspiring work of Rutishauser
et al. [1] opens the doors to a rich set
of questions that deserve further
investigation.
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E-Cadherin Help Fence In Yap1Metazoan cells translate adhesive events with neighbors into anti-proliferative
signals in the nucleus. The cadherin–catenin adhesion complex has long been
suspected of playing a key role in this process, and three recent papers suggest
that it does so by modulating subcellular localization of the Hippo pathway
component Yap1.Brian S. Robinson
and Kenneth H. Moberg*
Most metazoan cells spend their
lives in close apposition with adjacent
cells and must use a variety of
communication tools to organize group
activities and set standards for
communal living. One key to a stable
cellular neighborhood is preventing
cells from over-proliferating and
crowding out neighbors. A model
of cellular crowd control has evolved,
termed ‘contact inhibition’, in which
intercellular adhesion events block
proliferation. Cancer cells arerogues that by and large fail to abide
by this rule. An understanding of the
mechanisms underlying contact
inhibition, and why certain mutations
allow cancer cells to avoid it, has,
however, remained incomplete.
Three recent papers [1–3] now help to
fill this gap by identifying E-cadherin
and a-catenin, two protein
components of the cadherin–catenin
adhesion complex, as regulators of
Yes-associated protein-1 (Yap1),
a major oncogenic component of the
Hippo tumor suppressor network. In
doing so, these groups have
illuminated what could be a centralelement of the contact inhibition
mechanism.
Yap1 and Hippo
Yap1 and its homolog TAZ
(transcriptional co-activator with
PDZ-binding motif) are the main
targets of the vertebrate Hippo
growth regulatory pathway, which
was first identified in Drosophila and
shown to be a key regulator of organ
size and tumorigenesis in other
organisms, including vertebrates [4].
Canonical Hippo signals in vertebrate
cells are transduced through two
sequentially acting sets of kinases —
Mst1 and Mst2 (Mst1/2) and Lats1 and
Lats2 (Lats1/2) — to regulate
phosphorylation of Yap1.
Phosphorylated Yap1 (p-Yap1) is
sequestered in the cytoplasm by
14-3-3 proteins [4,5], while
unphosphorylated Yap1 shuttles
into the nucleus where it interacts
with context-specific partners to
drive expression of pro-proliferative
genes.
